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Rural credit programs have been used extensively since the 
early 1950s to stimulate production, to increase use of new 
technologies, and to ease poverty. 1 Most governments in low-
inc9me countries climbed on the credit-led-development bandwagon 
with generous support from donors such as the World Bank, the 
Inter-American Development Bank, the Agency for International 
Development, and the Food and Agriculture Organization. The 
World Bank alone allocated almost US$17 billion to agricultural 
credit through about 700 projects since the early 1950s. 2 Most 
of these programs included subsidized interest rates, targeted 
loans, and specialized agricultural credit institutions. For 
three decades policy makers and donors used credit as if it were 
the all-purpose "antibiotic" for treating rural problems. 
Despite a few successes, many of these credit efforts 
yielded disappointing results. Loan recovery problems, subsidy 
dependency, and insolvent financial institutions characterized 
many of these efforts (Adams and others 1987; Yaron 1992). 
Chronic problems led several major donors and numerous 
governments to shun traditional agricultural credit programs. 
When the final chapter on the history of these programs is 
written it should summarize the major lessons learned from this 
checkered experience. I suggest the following ten lessons for 
that SlllDlilary. 
LESSONS 
LESSON ONE: Subsidized credit failed to treat rural poverty 
(Gonzalez-Vega 1977). Subsidies attached to loans come in two 
forms: concessionary interest rates and loan defaults. Both 
subsidies are proportional to loan size: large loan, large 
subsidy; small loan small subsidy; and no loan no subsidy. Since 
poor people usually receive only small loans or no loans, and 
individuals who are better off economically have easier access to 
loans than do poor people, the overall impact of subsidized loans 
1For a sampling of early thinking about these activities see 
Bauer 1952, Fernandez y Fernandez 1972, Food and Agriculture 
organization 1965, and United Nations 1954. 
2see Donald 1976 and World Bank 1993a for evaluations of the 
rural cr~dit activities of the Agency for International 
Development and the World Bank. 
on income distributions is regressive. Furthermore, low interest 
rates on loans discourage lenders from offering credit to poor 
people and also force intermediaries to pay even lower rates on 
deposits to the determent of poor people who may have few options 
to save aside from deposits. 
LESSON TWO: credit also proved to be a weak instrument for 
stimulating agricultural production, farm investments, and use of 
new technology (Rosengrant and Herdt 1981). Loans, regardless of 
the interest rates attached to them, do not alter the various 
returns from economic activities available to borrowers, 
including consumption. A cheap loan does not make an 
unprofitable activity profitable. Prices of farm products, 
prices and availability of modern farm inputs, law-and-order, and 
access to new technology have a far stronger impact on farmers' 
decisions than do loans. Lending should follow, not lead 
economic opportunity. 
LESSON THREE: Using rural financial markets to allocate 
subsidies tied to loans, combined with extensive loan targeting, 
increased transaction costs for both lenders and borrowers 
{Cuevas and Graham 1984). These costs discouraged financial 
institutions from lending to targeted individuals and induced 
lenders to transfer additional transaction costs to non-preferred 
borrowers who were often the target group. This, in turn, 
dampened the demand for loans among the targeted group. Elevated 
transaction costs restrained the financial system from expanding 
into rural areas, from making small loans, and from seeking new 
clients (Von Pischke 1991). 
LESSON FOUR: The repression of rural financial markets 
caused by low interest rates and excessive transaction costs 
shrunk the ability of these markets to intermediate between 
surplus and deficit units (Shaw 1973). Some rural firms may lack 
funds to respond to economic opportunities that promise high 
rates of return at the same time that other firms or households 
have surplus resources they are unable to employ productively. A 
financial system intermediates between these surplus and deficit 
units by accepting deposits and by making loans on the basis of 
creditworthiness, thereby allocating resources more efficiently. 
Only a healthy formal financial system can perform this- delicate 
and diffused function. 
LESSON FIVE: A much larger number of people can benefit from 
deposit services than gain from borrowing (Vogel 1984). Many 
rural people are willing and able to save via deposits if given 
the opportunity and proper incentives. Deposit mobilization also 
imposes discipline on intermediaries (Poyo 1992). They are 
generally more careful in lending when using depositors' funds 
than they are when using government or donor funds. The most 
successful rural financial systems have been built on deposits. 
LESSON SIX: Loan recovery problems are usually less severe 
in institutions that mobilize deposits, that avoid transitory 
credit programs, and that are viewed as beinq dependable and 
durable (Patten and Rosenqard 1991; Poyo 1992). Financial 
programs that are perceived to be of high quality and that 
involve procedures which impose few transaction costs on clients 
are usually associated with better loan recovery performance than 
are programs without these characteristics. The quality of the 
relationship between borrowers and lenders strongly influences 
loan repayment. 
LESSON SEYEN: Non-farm rural enterprises are an increasingly 
important source of income for rural people (Liedholm and Mead 
1987). Rural financial institutions should, therefore, offer 
financial services--both loans and deposits--to any firm or 
household in rural areas, including microenterprises (Gonzales-
Vega and Sanabria 1993). In addition, many opportunities exist 
for providing financial services to women, particularly deposit 
accounts. 
LESSON EIGRT: Informal finance provides sustained financial 
services to a larger number of rural people than does the formal 
financial system in many countries. 3 These arrangements vary 
from simple loans among friends and relatives, to groups that 
both save and lend (tandas, being examples), to loans tied to 
marketing activities, and to informal organizations that operate 
as quasi-banks. Research has shown that competition, rather than 
monopoly, characterizes most transactions in informal finance. 
It may be more appropriate, therefore, to view informal finance 
as a useful supplement to formal finance, rather than as a 
nuisance that must be eliminated. 
LESSON NINE: Equity funding may be a more appropriate way to 
encourage the formation of successful new firms, such as 
agribusinesses, than is medium- and long-term debt. Equity is 
easier for new firms to manage than is debt and equity 
participation allows the funding organization to capture 
additional gains from successful firms that offset the losses 
from ventures that fail. 
LESSON TEN: Specialized agricultural lending institutions 
are accident prone, are vulnerable to political intrusions, and 
often do not mobilize deposits (Ladman and Tinnermeier 1981). 
Instead of creating such organizations it is more appropriate to 
encourage the development of several institutions that compete, 
and at the same time offer financial services to various segments 
of the rural population. This might include grass roots 
organizations such as credit unions, other types of non-
governmental organizations, cooperatives, and private banks. Any 
type of organization that can provide sustained financial 
services, and also be self sustaining, should be encouraged. 
~ere is a rapidly growing literature on informal finance. 
For examples see: Adams and Fitchett 1992; Kurtz and Showman 
1978; and·Velez-Ibanez 1983. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The lessons learned from four decades of traditional 
agricultural credit programs have resulted in both a broadening 
and a narrowing of views. Concerns have broadened from simply 
providing agricultural credit to providing loans for any 
creditworthy individual or firm in rural areas and also to 
offering deposit services. Because of this broadening, the term 
•rural finance' is increasingly replacing the term •aqricultural 
credit•. At the same time, there has been a narrowing in the 
perception of what can be accomplish with credit programs. There 
is increasing disillusionment with using credit to treat poverty 
and with using credit to prompt production and investment. 
Instead, many policy makers and donors have stepped off the 
credit-led bandwagon and are now focusing on how to develop 
efficient financial systems that provide sustained financial 
services--loans as well as deposits--to people living in rural 
areas (World Bank 1993b). 
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